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THE TAX TREATMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AWARDS:




This article examines the excludability of the payment of monetary awards for
claims of sexual harassment from federal income tax. Recent legislation narrowed the
range of awards eligible for exclusion from federal income.' But because the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") has yet to issue a comprehensive regulatory interpretation of
the new legislation, the tax treatment of awards for many tort and "tort-like" injuries
remains uncertain. The new legislation clearly grants an exclusion from taxation to tort
awards where damages stem from an overt, physical injury.2 Yet the United States Su-
preme Court has held that sexual harassment plaintiffs can be successful without proof
of either physical or psychological harm. Victims of sexual harassment, especially
those claiming injuries based on a hostile work environment, can incur damages where
the physical nature of their injuries is not immediately obvious and in fact quite difficult
to detect. The new legislation makes clear that, if the injuries from sexual harassment
do not rise above those associated with emotional distress, compensation cannot be ex-
cluded from the taxpayer's gross income.4
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") has an active recent his-
tory. Much of this activity is explained by the ever-growing total of monetary awards
for tort claims and the consequent mounting of total income that is, at least arguably,
excluded from taxation. From 1918 until the late 1980s, § 104(a)(2) of the Code allowed
a broad exclusion for all recoveries for personal injury. But after seventy years of grace,
Congress, the courts, and a more aggressive IRS have narrowed excludability consid-
erably.
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1. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003).
2. The Comm. on Labor & Emp. Law, Taxability of Payments Made on Account of Employment Dis-
crimination Claims, 55 REc. Ass'N. B. CrrY N.Y. 543, 549 (July/Aug. 2000). Here, the author decries the
legislative tax preference for a "car wreck broken neck." Id. at 551.
3. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993).
4. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
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The language of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 raised the level of
harm that a claimant must suffer before a settlement or court ordered award would be
excluded from taxation. Under this new legislative threshold, Congress has twice added
the qualifying word "physical." As a result, an excludable claim now must assert a "per-
sonal physical injur[y] or physical sickness."
5
While the new legislation may have narrowed the range of excludable awards, the
language did not create a bright line standard of excludability for emotional damages.6
Yet the legislation explicitly states that payments received for injuries or sicknesses
associated with "emotional distress" must be included in the taxpayer's gross income.
To reach the more demanding threshold of the 1996 legislation, victims of sexual har-
assment must have suffered emotional injuries more damaging than emotional distress.
For damages to warrant the special status of exclusion from taxation, the victim must
have suffered a physical injury or a physical sickness.
Neither the new federal tax legislation nor the congressional committee report re-
quires that the "personal physical injury or physical sickness" be the result of trauma
caused by a physical blow or physical contact. When a victim of sexual harassment has
suffered offensive physical contact, the injury and associated compensation should sat-
isfy the new threshold for emotional harm that rises to the level of a physical injury or
physical sickness before the award can be excluded from the taxpayer's gross income.
This article analyzes § 104(a)(2) of the Code and proposes regulatory language in
an effort to clarify some of the questions surrounding the excludability of income re-
ceived for claims of sexual harassment. Part II of this article provides background on the
historical evolution of § 104(a)(2), including a survey of relevant caselaw that addresses
the complexity and the uncertainty of excluding damage awards under this section. Part
III then analyzes the legislative and judicial attempts to establish uniform guidelines on
excludable damages. Lastly, Part IV proposes regulatory language aimed at clarifying
the injury threshold a plaintiff must satisfy in order to allow compensatory awards to be
excluded from federal taxation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Growing Number of Sexual Harassment Complaints
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bans discrimination based on an individ-
ual's sex. 7 By the early 1980s, federal courts recognized sexual harassment as a form of
illegal sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.8 By the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court
had agreed.9 If the number of harassment complaints filed with the U.S. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is an indication of the pervasiveness of sexual
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 144 (1996) ("Because all damages received on account of physical injury
or physical sickness are excludable from gross income, the exclusion from gross income applies to any dam-
ages received based on a claim of emotional distress that is attributable to a physical injury or physical sick-
ness.").
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003).
8. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
902 (1 1th Cir. 1982) ("hostile or offensive atmosphere created by sexual harassment can, standing alone,
constitute a violation of Title VII.").
9. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59 (1986).
[Vol. 30:2
The Tax Treatment of Sexual Harrassment Awards
harassment in the American workplace, it is extensive and not diminishing. A study of
sexual harassment examining the period between 1990 and 1996 showed that the num-
ber of complaints more than doubled from 6,172 in 1990 to 15,342 complaints in 1996.10
During the same period, compensatory damage awards to victims of sexual harassment
more than tripled from $7.7 million to $27.8 million." Recent data indicates a more
modest growth rate for both the number of sexual harassment complaints and the size of
the awards.' 2 In the year 2000, about 16,000 employees filed claims for sexual harass-
ment. 13
A growing body of literature recognizes sexual harassment as a serious problem in
American organizations and documents its powerful impact on victims.' 4 The ailments
suffered by victims of sexual harassment can range from minor headaches and insomnia
to the more severe afflictions of generalized anxiety disorder, panic-attacks, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and clinical depression.' 5 Characterizing and classifying the
severity of injuries from sexual harassment and similar torts can be difficult. Thus, the
new legislative threshold of injury necessitates an appreciation of when a settlement
award is excludable and when it is not.
B. The Section 104(a)(2) Exclusion
Gross income under § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code is defined broadly and in-
cludes "all income from whatever source derived."'16 The Supreme Court acknowledges
Congress's intent to exert the full measure of its taxing power and defines income as
"any accession to wealth."' 7 Accordingly, any receipt of monetary funds by a taxpayer is
presumed to be gross income under § 61, unless the taxpayer can demonstrate that the
new wealth fits into one of the narrowly construed exclusions defined in other sections
of the Code. i For nearly seventy years, § 104(a)(2) of the Code excluded from a tax-
payer's gross income all monies received as part of a judgment or settlement for "per-
sonal injuries or sickness."' 9 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 gave little direction on
what a taxpayer must show as proof that the damages were received "on account of per-
sonal injuries. ' '20 But, consistently, the courts construed this provision broadly and al-
lowed taxpayers to exclude from taxable income all payments for both physical and
psychological injuries, including both the emotional distress and the pain and suffering
associated with any and all of these injuries. 21 Even awards for economic injuries, such
10. Douglas Robson, Huge Surge of Sexual-Harassment Cases Hits the Courts, S.F. Bus. TIMES, May 19,
1997.
11. Id.
12. Kirk W. Turner & Christopher S. Thrutchley, Employment Law and Practices Training: No Longer
the Exception-It's the Rule, SHRM LEGAL REPORT, July-Aug. 2002.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Louise Fitzgerald & Jan Salisbury, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on the Workplace and
the Individual: The View From the Behavioral Sciences, 1996 A NAT'L INST, ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT B-1.
15. Id. at B-6.
16. I.R.C. § 61 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
17. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 (1992). See also Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426, 429 (1955); Commn'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327 (1995).
18. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 328. See also Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431.
19. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
20. Seay v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 32, 36 (1972).
21. The Comm. on Labor & Emp. Law, Taxability of Payments Made on Account of Employment
Discrimination Claims, 55 REc. ASSOC. B. CITY N.Y. 542 (July/Aug. 2000).
20041
Journal of Legislation
as lost back pay, were granted exclusion from taxation when the taxpayer showed that
her or she had suffered a personal injury. Perhaps equally important, when a settlement
included both taxable and non-taxable income, the IRS regularly afforded the parties
substantial latitude in allocating the size of the payment that fell into the portions that
would and would not be taxed.22
On August 20, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Small Business Job Pro-
tection Act23 that narrowed the exclusion of income to amounts received "on account of
personal physical injuries or physical sickness. 24 To warrant exclusion, the compensa-
tion must be for a "physical" injury. Compensation for "emotional distress," without
more, would not be excluded from the taxpayer's income, as it did not constitute a per-
sonal physical injury or physical sickness. The conference committee report noted that
"the term emotional distress includes physical symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headaches,
stomach disorders) which may result from such emotional distress. 25 Under the new
legislation, money received for emotional distress, even when accompanied by symp-
toms of physical discomfort, will be subject to federal income tax. In Revenue Ruling
96-65, the IRS held that payments received in satisfaction of a Tide VII claim for denial
of a promotion due to disparate treatment employment discrimination were both income
and wages. Payments received for emotional distress arising from this claim were not
excludable under § 104(a)(2).26 Where there has been no act of physical trauma, the
allegation of emotional distress alone is insufficient to allow exclusion of an award for a
claim of sexual harassment. In order for damages to be excludable, the commission of
sexual harassment must result in psychological trauma sufficient to cause personal
physical injury or physical sickness.27
C. The Payor's Intent and the Excludability of Damages
The courts have long held that the motivation behind a settlement agreement is a
critical component in determining the excludability of the damages. 28 The settlement
must be "reached 'in lieu' of the tort claim in existence at the time and 'on account of'
the personal injuries underlying the claim. '29 The central factor in determining whether
a settlement payment was made on account of injury or sickness is the intent of the
payor at the time of entering the settlement agreement. 30 The language contained in the
settlement agreement is often critical in determining the intent of the payor.31
When express language in a settlement agreement attributes specific dollar amounts
to specific claims, the courts give the apportionment substantial weight. 32 Commonly,
22. Id.
23. Pub. L. No. 104-408, 110 Stat. 1838 (1996).
24. Id. (codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003) (emphasis added)).
25. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., GEN. EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGIS. ENACTED
IN THE 104TH CONG. 224 (Joint Comm. Print 1996). See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2003) (stating emotional distress
shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness).
26. See Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6.
27. See Church v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 1104, 1106 (1983); see also Stocks v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 1, 9 (1992).
28. See Greer v. United States, 207 F.3d 322, 329 (6th Cir. 2000). See also Bent v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 236,
244 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987); Nagourney v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 954 (1989).
29. Greer, 207 F.3d at 329 (citing Kroposki v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1434 (1997)).
30. See Kurowski v. Comm'r, 917 F.2d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 1990); Agar v. Comm'r, 290 F.2d 283, 284
(2d Cir. 1961).
31. See Whitehead v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (RIA) 2173, 2175 (1980).
32. See Kroposki v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1434 (1997); Naqvi v. Rossiello, 746 N.E.2d 873, 877,
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however, courts are confronted with only broad language reciting that the settlement
agreement is for "any and all actions and claims." Absent explicit allocations to specific
claims, judges will look to any and all of the facts and circumstances that may indicate
the "intent of the payor as to the purpose in making the payment." 33 Indications of an
employer's intent may be found in the amount of money paid to this specific claimant,
in the amounts paid by this defendant in agreements with similar facts, as well as any
other factual conditions leading to the parties' agreement.34 The Tax Court ruled that, if
a claimant fails to show that the payment allocated to the tort or tort-like damages is
compensation for personal injuries, the entire award is presumed not to be excludable.35
For an award to be excludable from taxation, plaintiffs and other claimants must
clearly allege the existence of a tort in both their claims and initial pleadings and an
actual dispute must have existed at the time of reaching the settlement agreement.36 In
this requirement, plaintiffs making an allegation of sexual harassment against an em-
ployer can rely on the 1986 Supreme Court decision of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, which makes it quite clear that an allegation of sexual harassment is such a
tort.
3 7
D. Evolving Judicial Interpretations of Excludability
The 1918 version of § 104 of the Code excluded from income "[a]mounts received,
through accident or health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as com-
pensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received
whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness."3 8 While the 1996
amendments to § 104(a)(2) narrow the exclusion, several cases decided under the
broader 1918 standard continue to frame important considerations for excludability.
1. Metzger v. Commissioner: Awards from Income for "Invasions of Personal Rights"
A frequently cited case for the excludability of payments for personal injuries in an
unlawful termination of employment is Ana Maria Metzger v. Commissioner.39 In
Metzger, an associate college professor was not recommended for a tenured faculty
position. When her teaching position at the college was terminated, she alleged that the
college's decision to deny her tenure constituted a breach of contract and a violation of
both constitutional and Title VII statutory rights to be free from discrimination on the
basis of sex and national origin. She sought an award of back pay, reinstatement, a grant
of tenure, damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief. Metzger's complaint did not
specifically allege that the damages were for personal injuries.
880 (I11. App. 2001).
33. Knuckles v. Comm'r, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1965). See also Lubart v. Comm'r, 154 F.3d 539,
541 (5th Cir. 1998) (indicating "[tihe intent of the employer determines the treatment of the payment").
34. Greer v. United States, 207 F.3d at 329 (citing Pipitone v. United States, 180 F.3d 859, 864-65 (7th
Cir. 1999)); see also Knuckles, 349 F.2d at 613.
35. Wise v. Comm'r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1514, 1517 (1998).
36. See Pipitone, 180 F.3d at 862.
37. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
38. Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228, 233 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Pub. L. No. 65- 254, § 213(b)(6),
40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919)).
39. 88 T.C. 834 (1987), affd, No.87-1428 (3d Cir. Mar. 25, 1988).
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Metzger and the college settled the litigation for $75,000, without the college admit-
ting to any liability. The college preferred that the total settlement amount be character-
ized as wages, subject to withholding taxes, in order to protect itself against a later
charge that it had failed to comply with tax withholding obligations under the Code.
Conversely, Metzger preferred that only a minimal amount of taxes be withheld. The
parties finally agreed that the settlement would designate that half of the $75,000 pro-
ceeds were paid to her as back wages with the taxes withheld. While Metzger's com-
plaint did not include an allegation of "personal injuries," the settlement agreement
did.40 The claimant and the college had agreed to settle "all and in all manner of pres-
ently existing actions, and causes of action, suits, debts, and claims" and agreed that
those claims included "claims for reemployment, wages, compensatory damages for
personal injuries, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees. '41
In deciding whether the half of the settlement proceeds not attributable to wages
were excludable under § 104(a)(2) of the Code, the Tax Court in Metzger noted that the
petitioner made her claims under state and federal civil rights laws and looked closely at
the terms of the settlement agreement. After determining that $37,500 of the proceeds
paid by the college constituted "damages received on account of personal injuries," the
Metzger court concluded that this amount was excludable under § 104(a)(2). 42 Courts
have consistently held that the central test for establishing if a personal injury exists was
whether the violations were invasions of "personal rights. 43
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, several courts ruled that § 104(a)(2) allowed
taxpayers to exclude awards received for claims made under a broad range of state and
federal laws as damages received "on account of personal injuries.""
40. Id. at 843.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 860.
43. Thompson v. Comm'r, 89 TC. 632, 648-649 (1987) (noting "[slince the right to be free from gender
or sex discrimination is a personal right as the Supreme Court has held it follows that payments of damages
made for violation of that right are damages for personal injuries."). See, e.g., Bent v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 236
(1986), Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-693 (1979).
44. See Roemer v. Comm'r, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g 79 T.C. 398 (1982), nonacq.; Rev. Rul.
85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55 (holding damages received on account of injury to professional or business reputa-
tion); Bent v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 236 (1986), affd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987) (addressing settlement payment
in action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Threlkeld v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th
Cir. 1988) (finding damages received for injury to professional or business reputation); Metzger v. Comm'r,
88 T.C. 834 (1987), affd No.87-1428 (3d Cir. Mar. 25, 1988) (concerning payment received in settlement of
claims of sexual discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985(3), 1986, 2000e-5 and state dis-
crimination laws); Thompson v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 632 (1987), affd, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (concerning
liquidated damages awarded under Equal Pay Act); Byrne v. Comm'r, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989), affg and
rev'g 90 T.C. 1000 (1988) (finding entire payment received on account of termination allegedly in violation of
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and state wrongful discharge law); Rickel v. Comm'r, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.
1990), revg in part 92 T.C. 510 (1989) (addressing amounts awarded under Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA)); Hill v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 88 (D. Kan. 1990) (concerning damages awarded for
misrepresentation); Pistillo v. Comm'r, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990), revg T.C.M. 1989-329 (regarding back
pay award under ADEA); Downey v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 634 (June 29, 1993) on reconsideration of 97 T.C.
150 (1991) (concerning back pay and liquidated damages under ADEA); Keller v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH)
401 (1991) (same), aff d, No. 92-70787 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1994); Stocks v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 1 (1992) (holding
portion of settlement proceeds allocable to charge of race discrimination); Paton v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH)
1150 (1992) (addressing payment from employer of late husband to widow).
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2. United States v. Burke: Claims Sounding in Tort
The United States Supreme Court first addressed § 104(a)(2) in 1992. In United
States v. Burke, employees of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) filed a discrimina-
tion lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 45 The parties eventually
entered into a settlement agreement. When the TVA withheld federal income taxes from
the award amount, the employees filed claims with the IRS requesting refunds. The IRS
denied the refund request and the employees filed suit. Ultimately, the case reached the
Supreme Court, where the Court ruled that back pay awards for sex discrimination under
Title VH are not excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2) as damages received
on account of personal injury.46 It is important to note that the parties in Burke had made
claims under Title VII prior to its amendment by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 47 The
Court acknowledged that employment discrimination can cause grievous harm to its
victims, yet it did not necessarily follow that a personal injury qualifying under §
104(a)(2) had occurred. To be eligible for exclusion, the Court required that the statute
under which taxpayers brought suit must provide traditional tort remedies for its viola-
tion.4 8 The pre-1991 version of Title VII authorized only the recovery of back pay. So,
this statute had a much narrower conception of injury and remedy than did a traditional
tort. This early version of Title VII allowed recovery for the economic injury of wrong-
fully denied back pay, but had no provision for compensatory damages for medical ex-
penses or for the emotional distress or other injuries that might result from discrimina-
49tion.
Interestingly, some courts construed Burke as allowing the exclusion of all recover-
ies for claims sounding in traditional tort theories.50 The IRS concurred with this inter-
pretation and issued an expansive revenue ruling in 1993 permitting the exclusion of
both back pay and compensatory damages if the traditional, broad range of tort remedies
were available in the statute used in the taxpayer's claim.5' The revenue ruling made
specific reference to the present version of Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and the Old Civil Rights Acts as statutory claims that would qualify for exclusion.52
3. Commissioner v. Schleier: A Two-Pronged Test for Excludability
Three years after Burke, the Supreme Court re-examined § 104(a)(2) in Commis-
sioner v. Schleier.53 Expanding upon the Burke decision, it held that while the existence
of a tort or a tort-like claim was a necessary condition for excludability, it was not a
sufficient condition. 4 The Court added a second prong to the test for exclusion. First, a
tort or tort-type claim must be made at the time of the initial claim; and second, the tax-
45. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
46. Id. at 245-46.
47. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
48. Burke, 504 U.S. at 235.
49. Id. at 238-40.
50. See Horton v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 93 (1993), affd, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994); O'Gilvie v. United
States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996) (holding punitive damages received by petitioners were not excluded from income
taxation because damages were not received on account of personal injuries).
51. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
52. ld. at p. 8-9.
53. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
54. Id. at 336-37.
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payer must demonstrate that the damages or settlement proceeds were received on ac-
count of personal injury or sickness. 55 The Court noted that the claim alleged must be a
bona fide claim, but not necessarily a sustainable or valid claim.
56
In Schleier, the taxpayer was a former employee of United Airlines. Pursuant to
company policy, United terminated Schleier's employment when he reached the age of
sixty.57 Schleier then filed a complaint in federal district court alleging that United had
violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 58 Schleier's com-
plaint was consolidated with complaints filed by other similarly-situated taxpayers as
part of a class action. The class action plaintiffs and United entered into a settlement
agreement. Under the settlement, one half of each settlement award was attributed to
back pay and the other half was attributed to the liquated damages available under the
ADEA.5 9
When filing his 1986 income tax return, Schleier included as gross income the back
pay, but not the payment of the ADEA liquidated damages.60 The Commissioner issued
a deficiency notice asserting that the liquidated damages amount should be included as
income. Schleier objected and initiated tax court proceedings contesting the Commis-
sioner's ruling. 6' In these proceedings, Schleier contended that the entire award, includ-
ing the back pay, was excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2) and, based on
Downey v. Commissioner,62 he prevailed in the Tax Court. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision for the taxpayer. As evidence of the inconsistent in-
terpretations coming from the courts, the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits shortly thereafter reached opposite conclusions on whether recoveries under the
ADEA were excludable under § 104(a)(2). 63
The Supreme Court's decision in Schleier held that liquated damages recovered un-
der the ADEA were not excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2).64 The Court
made clear that if a taxpayer suffers personal injury and recovers damages for: (a) medi-
cal expenses not previously deducted; (b) lost wages; and (c) pain and suffering and
emotional distress, and if each of these payments is received "on account of personal
injury," the award would be excludable from gross income.65 Yet, Schleier's recovery of
both back wages and liquidated damages did not fall within the §104(a)(2) exclusion
because neither satisfied the critical requirement of being "on account of personal injury
or sickness." The court reasoned, "[w]hether one treats [Schleier's] attaining the age of
60 or his being laid off on account of his age as the proximate cause of [Schleier's] loss




56. See Sodoma v. Comm'r, 96 T.C.M. (RIA) 275 (1996); Foster v. Comm'r, 96 T.C.M. (RIA) 276
(1996).
57. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 325.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2003).
59. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 326.
60. Id. at 323.
61. Id.
62. 100 T.C. 634 (1993).
63. See Schmitz v. Comm'r, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding ADEA recovery excludable) and
Downey v. Comm'r, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), rev'g 100 T.C. 634 (1993) (ADEA recovery taxable). Noting
the conflict among the circuits, the Government petitioned for a writ of certiorari.
64. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 328-29.
65. Id. at 330.
66. Id.
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The Court added that while the "unlawful termination may have caused some psy-
chological or 'personal' injury comparable to the intangible pain and suffering caused
by an automobile accident, it is clear that no part of [Schleier's] recovery of back wages
is attributable to that injury." 67 "[B]ecause the recovery of back wages was not 'on ac-
count of' any personal injury and because no personal injury affected the amount of
back wages recovered," § 104(a)(2) does not permit their exclusion.68 Further, the liqui-
dated damages provision of the ADEA allowed a much narrower range of remedies than
those allowed in a traditional tort. Neither payment of the back pay or the liquidated
damages under the ADEA qualified for exclusion. The Court emphasized that an award
could be excluded from taxation "only when it both (i) was received through prosecu-
tion or settlement of an action based upon tort or tort-type rights ... and (ii) was re-
ceived 'on account of personal injuries or sickness."'
69
4. LeFleur v. Commissioner: Dishonoring the Allocation Reached by Parties
While the IRS has given substantial weight to the allocations contained in settle-
ment agreements to which it was not a party, it has never been bound by these agree-
ments. 70 The allocation among the various claims included in a settlement can be chal-
lenged where the facts and circumstances indicate that the allocation does not reflect the
economic substance of the settlement.7'
In LeFleur v. Commissioner,72 the Tax Court addressed the allocation issue in a
case seeking compensatory and punitive damages for claims of breach of contract, fraud
and personal injury arising out of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The taxpayer, a vice-president of a Blount subsidiary about to be sold, voiced reserva-
tions about the parent company's commitment to a promised bonus and severance pack-
age and was terminated. In an out-of-court written settlement, the parties allocated the
million dollar settlement as: $200,000 for breach of contract, $800,000 for the personal
injury claim, and zero dollars to the claims for fraud and punitive damages. 73 The tax-
payer excluded the $800,000 from income under § 104(a)(2). The IRS disregarded the
terms of the written settlement agreement and reallocated the $800,000 between contract
and punitive damages, both of which are included in the taxpayer's gross income.74 In
upholding the IRS reallocation, the Tax Court stated, "the allocation did not accurately
reflect the realities of the petitioner's underlying claims." 75 Negotiations clearly consid-
ered the tax effects of the allocation and the settlement agreement did not reflect coun-
sels' estimates of the probability of success on the merits of the various claims. In de-
termining that the $800,000 was not excludable under § 104(a)(2), the court stated: "In
67. Id.
68. Id. at 331.
69. Id. at 333-34.
70. See Robinson v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 116 (1994), rev'd in part on other grounds, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir.
1995).
71. See Phoenix Coal Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 231 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1956); Bagley v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 396
(1995), affd, 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997). See also Hemelt v. United States, 122 F.3d at 208 (4th Cir. 1997)
(finding "the characterization of a settlement cannot depend entirely on the intent of the parties" (citation
omitted)).
72. LeFleur v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 37 (1997).
73. Id. at 12-13.
74. Id. at 33.
75. Id. at 29.
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light of the facts and circumstances, we conclude that petitioner suffered no injury to his
health that could be attributed to the actions of the defendants, and we are not persuaded
that such injury was the basis of any payment to him by Blount.
' 76
The LeFleur decision makes clear that a settlement must reflect the actual damages
suffered by the plaintiff and that an aggressive allocation to exclude damages will face
the scrutiny of both the IRS and the courts.
5. Robinson v. Commissioner: Parties Must be Adversarial on Allocation Issue
In Robinson v. Commissioner,77 the taxpayer successfully sued a bank for failing to
release a lien on his property. The jury awarded Robinson nearly $60 million in dam-
ages that included $6 million for lost profits, $1.5 million for personal injuries and $50
million for punitive damages. 78 The parties then agreed to settle the matter for $10.7
million. 79 Through Robinson's urging, the settlement allocated 95% of the damages to
personal injuries and the trial judge entered a final judgment in accordance with the
terms of the settlement agreement. 80 The Commissioner disagreed with the allocation in
the court order and determined only five percent of the settlement proceeds should be
attributable to personal injury damages and excludable. The Tax Court agreed and found
that the trial court's final judgment did not accurately reflect the underlying settlement,
nor did the court independently review the allocation contained in the settlement.
More recently, when reviewing the allocation of an award, the IRS ruled that a set-
tlement is binding for tax purposes so long as "the agreement is entered into by the par-
ties in an adversarial context, at arm's length, and in good faith.",8' However, if the par-
ties are adversarial with respect to the dollar amount, but not adversarial on the issue of
the allocation, neither the IRS nor the federal courts will be bound by a settlement allo-
cation, even when it is included in a final judgment of a court.82
III. ANALYSIS
While substantial uncertainty still surrounds the limits of the exclusion under §
104(a)(2) of the Code, there is a developing body of law that helps clarify the central
definitions of a qualifying injury, a tort-type right and the damages eligible for exclu-
sion.
A. Defining a Personal Physical Injury or Physical Sickness
In 1992, when the Supreme Court wrote its decision in Burke, neither the courts nor
the IRS recognized a distinction between physical and nonphysical injuries in defining
76. Id. at 32.
77. 102 T.C. 116 (1994), rev'd in part on other grounds, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995).
78. Id. at 12-14.
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id.
81. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200244004 (June 19, 2002), citing Threlkeld v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. at 1306-07
(1986); Fono v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. at 680,694 (1982), affd without pub. opinion, 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984).
82. Robinson v. Conu'r, 70 F.3d 34, 37 (1995); see also Bagley v. Conm'r, 105 T.C. 396 (1995), aff'd
121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997); Threlkeld v. Conn'r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1306-07 (1986), affid 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988).
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exclusions under § 104(a)(2). 83 All damages awarded for sexual harassment and other
forms of discrimination under the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, the Fair Housing Act, and
the present (post-1991) Title VII were highlighted by the Court as clearly qualifying for
exclusion.84 Yet, the 1996 Small Business Job Protection Act introduced a requirement
that the award be for an injury or sickness that is "physical. 85 Once the "physical"
threshold is reached, compensation for a broad range of psychological and emotional
damages can be excluded from the taxpayer's income.86 The legislation does not require
a physical trauma, a wound or even physical contact. But, in a sexual harassment case
where there is no physical contact, the result of the psychological harm to the claimant
must be sufficient to constitute a physical injury or sickness. Congress made clear that
the injury must be more severe than emotional distress and that the psychological harm
must be accompanied by physical symptoms more dramatic than headaches, insomnia or
stomach disorders.87
In the absence of a physical injury, the new standard concludes that emotional dis-
tress is too subtle, too ephemeral or, perhaps, too easily feigned to warrant exclusion.
There are many disappointments in the workplace, and employees adversely impacted
by the actions of others often suffer bad feelings and distress. The 1996 amendments
presume that a victim of illegal sexual harassment will "get over" the emotional distress
she has suffered, that emotional distress alone is a "soft" injury leaving little or no en-
during or permanent loss. Yet, an impressive body of medical evidence documents that
some victims of sexual harassment suffer psychological trauma sufficient to result in
diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, panic-attacks
and even clinical depression. 88 These medical conditions are accompanied by suffi-
ciently dramatic physical symptoms to constitute a physical injury or physical sickness.
Psychological trauma resulting in a diagnosable psychological disorder is qualitatively
different than the "emotional distress" specifically removed from the exclusion.
The statutory requirement that the injury or sickness be "physical" implies that
claims of psychological trauma or psychological disorder be substantiated by medical
examinations performed by appropriately trained medical personnel. These psychiatric
and psychological examinations must establish a medical record substantiating the pres-
ence of an enduring or persistent condition impairing the claimant's psychological
health. By adding the word "physical" to the "personal injury or sickness" threshold for
exclusion in § 104(a)(2), Congress intended that the psychological damage from torts
like sexual harassment must rise above the short-lived distress of a headache or upset
stomach to a level of persistence or permanence more akin to a broken bone or a scar.
83. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235-36 (affirming in the text, as well as in a lengthy footnote,
the exclusion in I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) was meant to include both physical and nonphysical injuries).
84. Id. at 239-40.
85. Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1838 (1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)).
86. If an action has its origin in physical injury or physical sickness, even damages paid to another person
as loss of consortium are excluded from gross income. H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 143-44 (1996).
87. See Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1838 (1996).
88. See, e.g., Louise Fitzgerald & Jan Salisbury, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on the Workplace and
the Individual: The View From the Behavioral Sciences, 1996 A NAT'L INST. ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT B- 1.
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B. Defining a Tort or Tort-Type Right
For income to be excludable, it must be from an award for the violation of a tort or
tort-type right. The Supreme Court has equated these rights to claims where a full range
of remedies is available. In Burke, the back pay limitation under pre-1991 Title VII, and
in Schleier, the liquidated damages available under the ADEA, the claim did not rise to
the level of tort or tort-type rights eligible for exclusion under § 104(a)(2). The Court
did not articulate a clear rationale as to why, as a matter of policy or logic, the range of
remedies available for a particular claim should determine whether the resulting dam-
ages should be taxable.89 In the absence of a precise rationale for equating exclusion to
the range of remedies available when a right has been violated, lower courts have looked
to a variety of criteria, such as the right to a jury trial or the availability of a specific
remedy as critical in determining whether a settlement award is excludable.
90
When the Supreme Court denied exclusion for the back pay and liquidated damages
recovered through the limited statutory torts in Burke (pre-1991 Title VII) and Schleier
(ADEA), both of these awards constituted the replacement of compensation that, if the
employer had not committed the discriminatory act, would quite clearly have been tax-
able as wages. Arguably, in its rulings on § 104(a)(2), the Court established a standard
where exclusion is reserved for awards that constitute the "return of human capital" lost
to a tortfeasor and not merely the replacement of lost compensation. 91 Taxing an award
for pay unfairly denied by discrimination avoids a windfall to the taxpayer. The delayed
pay awarded to the victim of discrimination would ordinarily be taxable and does not
merit the special status of exclusion. Conversely, when an award compensates a victim
of discrimination for a physical injury or sickness, excluding the income from taxation
allows the full return of human capital and leaves the taxpayer whole.
C. Excludability of Back Pay and Other Economic Damages
The Supreme Court majority in Schleier added a second prong to the test for ex-
cludability and required a link between the cause of action and the damages recovered.92
In Schleier, the Court found an award for back pay ineligible for exclusion under §
104(a)(2), even when the tortfeasor's conduct caused a personal injury. 93 While Mr.
Schleier may well have suffered emotional distress as a result of his firing, the award of
back pay was for compensation not received, not for his psychological distress. To qual-
89. See generally Carolyn F. Kolks, Note, United States v. Burke - Does it Definitively Resolve the
Analytical Confusion Created by the Section 104(a)(2) Personal Injury Exclusion?, 46 ARK L. REV. 657
(1993); Michael C. Witte, Note, Tax Ramifications of Age Discrimination in Employment Act Awards Under
the Section 104(a)(2) Exclusion, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 181 (1995).
90. Compare Downey v. Comm'r, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the ADEA does not afford a
broad range of remedies and therefore, under Burke, damages were taxable) with Schmitz v. Comm'r, 34 F.3d
790 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the ADEA does afford a broad range of remedies and therefore, under Burke,
damages were excludable).
91. See F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory
Tort Damages for Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725, 738-44 (1997).
92. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 337.
93. See Frank J. Doti & Peter J. Rimel, Does the U.S. Supreme Court's Schleier Decision Limit the Per-
sonal Injury Exclusion to Physical Injuries?, CAL. TAX LAW, Spring 1996, at 46; see also Robert M. Elwood,
Supreme Court Ruling on Taxation of Discrimination Damages Provides Little Resolution, 83 J. TAX'N 148
(1995) (discussing continuing ambiguities and problems left unresolved by the Schleier court).
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ify for exclusion, the award must be linked to a personal injury caused by the violation
of a tort or tort-type right.94
Remuneration for employment constitutes wages even though at the time the remu-
neration is paid, the relationship of employer and employee no longer exists.95 The
Supreme Court has made clear that the term "remuneration for employment" is not lim-
ited to payments made for work actually performed, but includes the entire employer-
employee relationship for which the employer pays compensation to the employee.96
Awards for economic injuries associated with sexual harassment, such as back pay or
front pay, will face a rough road to exclusion.
Settlement awards for economic injuries to an individual or business reputation, lost
economic potential, or lost future earning power all seem a far stretch from the statutory
requirement of a "physical" injury and should fairly be included in the taxpayer's gross
income.97
IV. PROPOSAL: A NEED FOR REGULATORY CLARIFICATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A
CLEAR STANDARD
Conflicting judicial opinions coupled with the difficulty of equating the psychologi-
cal harm in sexual harassment and comparable torts to physical injuries highlight the
need for regulatory clarification of the standard for excludability. The IRS can address
these problems through a regulatory ruling that establishes clear guidelines as to the
types of harm that meet and do not meet the statutory threshold for exclusion of a "per-
sonal physical injury and physical sickness." These guidelines should also clarify that
damage awards for lost wages and other economic injuries do not qualify for exclusion
when, had they not been improperly withheld, they would clearly have been subject to
income taxation.
We propose that the following regulatory language be adopted:
Gross income shall include compensatory damages received for back wages, front or
forward wages, lost economic potential and lost future earning potential.
Gross income shall include compensatory damages received for injury to individual
or business reputation.
Gross income shall include compensatory damages received for personal injury or
sickness resulting from emotional distress that causes headaches, stomach disorders,
94. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330.
95. See 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(a)-1(i) (2003).
96. See Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1946); see also Hemelt v. United States, 122
F.3d 204, 209-11 (4th Cir. 1997).
97. See Fabry v. Comm'r, 223 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2000); It should be noted that when damages are
excludable from a taxpayer's gross income under § 104(a)(2), they are not subject to employment taxes. See
26 C.F.R. § 32.1 (2003). But, the full range of employment taxes (FICA, FUTA, etc.) must be paid when an
amount received in settlement of a dispute is "remuneration for employment." See Alexander v. Internal Reve-
nue Service, 72 F.3d 938, 942 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding the test for purposes of determining the character of a
settlement payment for tax purposes "is not whether the action was one in tort or contract but rather the ques-
tion to be asked is 'in lieu of what were the damages awarded') (citations omitted); Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S.
28 (1941) (holding that an amount received upon cancellation of a lease was a substitute for the rent which
would have been paid under the lease and, thus, was taxable as ordinary income).
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insomnia, stress, mental anguish, self-doubt, embarrassment, and other physical and
psychological discomfort.
Gross income shall not include compensatory damages received for personal physical
injury or physical sickness, including those damages caused by a psychological
trauma or psychological disorder sufficient to result in a medical diagnosis of post-
traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, panic-attacks, or clinical de-
pression.
Adoption of the regulatory language proposed here should assist in clarifying the
types of injuries that qualify an award for exclusion from gross income under §
104(a)(2). A broad range of interested parties should benefit from the clarification.
Damages for sexual harassment are inherently complex, and the continuing uncertainty
surrounding these awards should compel the IRS to address the nature of the injuries
that are excludable.
